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The undue importance attached at times to the planning difficulties 
caused by administrative inefficiency seems to have been a source of 
somewhat distorted conclusions or recommendations,- It has been asserted, 
for example, that in many countries with a long history of self-government 
behind than, the personnel procedures and practices applied by the 
authorities make development planning totally impossible and that 
administrative deficiencies are not peculiar to the less developed countries, 
but are also observable in those at more advanced stages of growth« In 
the former, however, they represent a much more pressing problem inasmuch 
as they obstruct development Administrative inefficiency is consider«! 
to be particularly prejudicial at the stage of plan implementation«) 
Other observers have attributed failures in plan implementation 
primarily to the technical defects and unrealistic character of the plans 
themselves«^ The lack of realism may consist in disregarding the fact that 
a number of public agencies are ill-equipped to attain the targets established, 
or in assuming that the necessary adjustments in the agencies in question 
can be made in a flash, despite the formidable economic and social 
obstacles that will have to be overcome. But the importance of the public 
administration for plan implementation is relative because "in most of the 
developing countries, most agricultural and industrial production and a 
1/ Albert Waterston, "Administrative obstacles to planning", Information 
document N° 5, presented at the Seminar on the Organization and 
Administration of Development held under the auspices of the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) at 
Santiago, Chile, in 1965* 
2j United Nations, Committee for Development Planning: Report on the 
second session (E/4362); Organization of American States (OAS), 
"El control de la ejecuci6n de planes generales de desarrollo en 
América Latina" (E/AC,54/1,20), submitted at the second session of 
the Committee for Development Planning; and United Nations Centre 
for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, "Seme general 
conditions for the effective implementation of plans" (E/AC»54/Le8), 




major part of investment are undertaken within the private sector; and 
while the influence which most governments can exert on the private sector 
is not inconsiderable, it is not so great that it can in any way ensure 
3/ 
that the necessary decisions will be taken" 
Thè importance of this statement is obvious, since in each individual 
country the possibilities of implementing development plans will depend 
upon how true it is. And it would seem, unfortunately, that in practice 
circumstances have often made it difficult for the public sector to 
manipulate the tax and financial instruments whereby it might induce the 
private sector to conform to the policies and meet the targets established 
in development plans» In some instances, the reason why the private 
sector has not acted in accordance with the plan is probably not merely 
that the objectives for the public sector are unrealistic; the technical 
defects of the plan may understandably be greater in relation to the 
private sector, on which comprehensive information is harder to obtain, 
inasmuch as it is far larger, more diversified and more independent« In 
other cases, however, non-compliance may have been due to problems arising 
in connexion with the use of tax, financial or strictly monetary instruments, 
either for want of flexibility in the institutional framework, or as a 
result of weaknesses in the financial systems concerned or in consequence 
of the extent to which a particular national economy is a market economy 
in the true sense of the term, or because of lack of co-ordination between 
the planning agencies and the monetary authorities» Any or all of these 
factors may of course operate in different combinations» 
From the purely administrative standpoint, co-ordination between the 
planning agencies and the monetary authorities is of particular importance, 
since it is largely a matter of organization and procedures. It is true 
that organization alone cannot, in itself, reconcile opposing attitudes 
which are deeply rooted in scientific or technical convictions, especially 
when group interests or codes òf values are involved«^ Fortunately, however, 
United Nations Centre for Development Planning, Projections and Policies, 
"Some general conditions for the effective implementation of plans", 
op, cit., p.3. 
y See ILPES, Seminario de planes operativos anuales» Santiago, 1966, 




this is no longer necessary» In the past, central banks in Latin America 
often withheld support from over-all planning, or openly opposed 
development policies that might produce inflationary effects, as indeed 
they were sometimes designed ta do as a means of effecting transfers of 
income to the entrepreneurial sector»^ This opposition or indifference 
to planning on the part of the central banks probably stemmed from their 
short-teim practices and techniques;, concern for monetary stability on 
the other hand, has become a motive for a rapprochement between the central 
banks and the planning agencies, since the latter have invariably opted in 
favour of "developmart without inflation"»^/ 
Although in practice the central banks and the central planning 
agencies are no longer at variance, perhaps the best of the possible 
organizational alternatives would be one providing for a division of labour, 
by virtue of vfoich the central planning agency would undertake the 
formulation and supervision of medium- and long-tem plans, and the central 
bank would prepare the economic, monetary and exchange budgets» Annual 
plans of operation would be drawn up jointly, in collaboration with the 
7 / 
central office responsible for the fiscal budget Such a division would 
make for unity» It would help to ensure that a part would really be played 
in plan formulation by the institutions that would subsequently have to 
supervise the attainment of urgent objectives set forth in the public 
sector's programme of expenditure or would be mainly responsible for 
inducing the private sector to follow the guidelines laid down. It would 
also serve as a means of assigning tasks of differing content and nature 
to the agencies possessing special qualifications and experience in the 
appropriate fields» 
jj/ Jorge Ahumada, En vez de la miseria, sixth edition, Santiago, 1967, p»35» 
6/ These questions are discussed at length in a study by Frank Tamagna, 
La Banca Central en América Latina» published by the Centre for Latin 
American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), Mexico, 1963 • See also 
Roque Carranza, Development and stabilization policies in Latin America; 
some problems (E/AC«54/L*4)® 





Perhaps the co-ordination of the various functions allocated to such 
agencies would be facilitated in practice if the medium-term plan, besides 
coinciding with the government's tern in office, established objectives 
for the last year of the period, rather than annual sectoral targets to 
down to the lowest'level of aggregation consistent with political 
significance, for the purpose of obtaining the appropriate, parliamentary 
sanction» They should be submitted to the Legislature together with, 
for purposes of comparison, a statement of. what would probably be achieved 
by the end of the period, if the economy was left to the interplay of 
market forces and no attempt was made to adopt the development strategy 
and policies set forth in the bases of the medium-term plan presented by 
the Executive» 
Given a medium-term plan with this type of structure, the task of 
determining annual operational targets would be the concern of the central 
bank, essentially on account of its monetary repercussions and the 
responsibilities the bank would have to shoulder in respect of the 
co-ordination of financial agencies; it would concern the central planning 
office, in particular because it would involve ensuring that sectoral 
targets were compatible, in terms of quality, quantity and timing, with 
the final objectives9 strategy and policies established in the plan; it 
would concern the agency responsible for the fiscal budget and the sectoral 
government services, because it would virtually determine their work 
programmes for the following fiscal year; and it would concern the private 
sector, for a similar reason, and because of the repercussions of credit 
restrictions and of public income and expenditure on the level and 
structure of production» 
Interests as strong as these would undoubtedly constitute powerful 
motives for the co-ordination of the various fields of experience and 
specialization, which would be effected continuously throughout the year, 
8/ This does not, of course, preclude determining which parts of the 
major public investment projects or programmes should be put into 
effect during each fiscal year in a given period. 




in conformity with a time schedule for the preparation of the relevant 
instruments: an exploratory economic budget, an economic budget forecast, 
a fiscal budget, and an annual operational plan» It is in the formulation 
of the annual plan that the co-operation of the private sector - largely 
based on contacts maintained throughout the year between the various 
government agencies and the corresponding subdivisions of the private 
sector - would be most valuable; but during the last stage, when the 
final administrative decisions that would shape the annual operational 
plan were to be taken, an a.d hoc advisory committee should be set up, 
composed of representatives of the central planning agencies, the central 
bank and the investment banks or financing centres, the central fiscal 
budget office, and the subdivisions of the private sector concerned with 
the main brandies of agriculture, basic and intermediate industrial 
production, and transporto 
It has been said elsewhere that administration for development is 
the sum of the action that the government should take in pursuit of the 
national development plan objectives. Such a definition, besides presupposing 
that the plan is technically sound and therefore that its implementat ion 
and supervision are practical possibilities, has the further merit of 
reducing "administration for development" to its proper proportions. 
The formulation of a technically satisfactory plan raises preliminary 
administrative problems which were not solved at the right time in many 
Latin American countries and have consequently been among the causes of 
failure to implement development plans« A basic requisit would have been 
9/ 
to improve information services and statistical systems and train enough 
personnel for the central and sectoral planning agencies. As an indicator 
of the technical backwardness of the Latin American countries in this 
respect, suffice it to say that only two or three of thorn have begun to use 
,2/ See, for example, Alfonso Perea Posada, Chief, Statistical Section, 
Economic and Social Development Division, Inter-American Development 
Bank (II®), "La organización de sisteaas estadísticos nacionales para 
satisfacer las necesidades de desarrollo económico y social en la 
América Latina» (ICAP/EXT/024/1300/67). 
/economic budgets, 
ST/SCLA/Conf «30/L «9 
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economic budgets, and that difficulties are encountered in the shape of 
gaps, deficiencies and time-lags in the supply of statistical data,' and 
lack of the highly-qualified personnel required« To remedy these short-
comings should be the first objective of administration for development« 
The next essential step should have been to adapt the public 
administration for the task of plan implement ation• It is here that a 
fallacy has been very commonly entertained« This adaptation is believed 
to involve an over-all administrative reform designed ti> rationalize 
structures and procedures, with a view to expediting and improving the 
decision-making process, defining responsibilities and reducing operational 
costs; to. improve the quality of administrative personnel by means of 
a post classification, the introduction of the merit system and of other 
techniques; and to perfect and simplify auditing standards and practices« 
The favourable effects of these and other similar measures would malee 
themselves felt in a relatively short timé, appreciably sooner than the 
impact of planning« 
This is a Utopian dream« In several Latin American countries the 
bases of the merit system have been in the Constitution for many years $ yet 
appointments and promotions are. still determined almost entirely by political 
considerations» Agencies set up decades ago to promote the rationalization 
of the administrative system have incurred the animosity of politicians and 
pressure groups, have lost prestige and have sometimes become virtually 
inoperative« Public posts have been created far in excess of real manning-
table requirements, as a form of social welfare service, necessitated by 
the incapacity of the economic system to employ a substantial proportion 
of the new population contingents annually joining the labour force. These 
and other circumstances inevitably lead to administrative inefficiency, 
which is an effect of economic under—development, but also one of its most 
operative causes. The increase in the public sector's personnel expenditure, 
which is proportionally higher than the growth rate of the gross domestic 
product,^/ has augmented the tax burden, which in its turn pushes up the 
10/ See Gonzalo Martner, Planificación y presupuesto por programas» 




costs of enterprises and reduces family income, through price mechanisms 
or direct taxation» The domestic market thus becomes smaller, and exports 
may be adversely affected» Furthermore, the rise in administrative costs, 
almost invariably stemming originally from heavier expenditure on staffing, 
has in many countries been among the causes of budget deficits, which are 
often financed by inflationary means» What is more, even if the budget 
was balanced, the parasitic nature of many public-sector posts implies 
that purchasing power is given to a sizable social group which contributes 
nothing to the market in the way of goods or services but, on the contrary, 
in order to keep up a semblance of employment, complicates procedures, 
increases red tape and makes the administrative machinery cumbersome» This 
is one of the structural causes of inflation or of economic stagnation in 
cases where an attempt is made to eliminate the fiscal budget deficit by 
reducing the capital outlays of the public sector» 
The strategy and tactics for administrative rationalization that ought 
to be dictated by such a state of affairs would probably require that 
certain agencies immediately responsible for the attainment of plan objectives 
should be separated from the general system, so that they could be given 
priority treatment, almost inevitably under a régime of provisional 
administrative and financial autonomy. Alternatively, new agencies might 
be set up, whose personnel would preferably be recruited from among officials 
already in the services so as to obviate additional costs» 
As the national economy developed and the new production structurés 
became incompatible with the older institutions and practices of the 
traditional public agencies, broader and more general administrative reforms 
would gradually become politically feasible» In all probability, they 
would be called for by industrialists and their spokesmen in Parliament or 
in the Press, as has already happened in developed economies and in some 
of the Latin American countries where special circumstances have made for 
a high growth rate, even without any planning »i^ 
11/ See Freddy Arreaza Leânez, "Administrative reform in Venezuela" 
(ST/ECLA/Conf.30/L»3)5 and, for example, the reference made by 
Jesse Burkhead in Public Budgeting to the United States1 prolonged 
campaign on behalf of more efficient budgeting methods, which was 
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Such an approach would facilitate the implementation of short-term 
plans» To give sweeping and politically impracticable administrative 
reforms precedence over the necessary adjustments in agencies directly 
responsible for short-term plan implementation (which constitute only 
a tiny fraction of the whole system) would doom to failure both plan 





THE LINKS BETWEEN PLANNING AND POLICY-MAKIffi 
On several occasions, official United Nations documents have drawn 
attention to the basic importance of policy decisions in the field of 
economic and social planning, and have pointed out that the existing 
legal institutions in the Latin American countries are inadequate to 
ensure that such decisions are of the highest possible quality and are 
taken at the right moment at each stage of the planning process«^ 
It is true that ordinary law can institutionalize planning and can 
even determine the timing and to some extent the nature of the relevant 
government decisions; but it is equally true that the basic functions 
and relations of the Executive and the Legislature are regulated by the 
national Constitution and that, in normal circumstances nothing can be 
of greater political importance than fundamental decisions bearing on 
the economic and social life of the nation» Consequently, the over-all 
development plan and the fiscal budget, being the principal documents in 
which such decisions are embodied, must inevitably be the subject of 
constitutional provisions» Moreover, some of the financial and budget 
regulations established in Constitutions which pre-date planning are 
incompatible with the planning process or at least unfavourable to it® 
1« The experience of the socialist countries 
It was in the socialist countries that planning was first placed on 
a constitutional footing. Some of the principles expressed or implicitly 
adopted seem to have reappeared in the revisions of their Constitutions 
effected by other countries which, although their economy is pre—eminently 
based on free enterprise, have decided in favour of economic planning» 
Accordingly, these principles are of special interest» 
1/ Committee for Development Planning; Report on the Second Session, 
op.cit., p.2# Economic Survey of Latin America^ 1964» United Nations 




In the centrally-planned economies the national assemblies (Legislature) 
nominate the Council of Ministers (Government, Executive)® The plan is 
drawn up by the Executive and approved by the Legislature, and so are 
the annual fiscal budgets» In some cases the president of the central 
planning agency is a member of the Executive» Over-all planning objectives 
are laid down in the national Constitutions} which usually contain 
provisions designed to ensure that the plans are as far as possible the 
• 2 / 
product of a national effort in which most of the citizens share»-' 
In the socialist countries the State budget is an instrument for 
the implementation of short-term economic plans, particularly from the 
financial standpoint« "The purpose of financial planning is to determine 
the funds required in order to implement the economic plan, to distribute 
them among the various economic sectors and different types of socio-
cultural construction in accordance with the plan targets, and to bring 
about savings in materials and monqy« 
"The main component of the entire financial system is the State 
budget the State budget is the main State financial plan and serves to 
combine the various financial plans into a unified system of financial 
planning«"^/ 
Despite these characteristics, which make the State budget a kind of 
matrix of sources and uses of funds, linked to short-term plan implementation 
- or precisely because of them -, its rejection by Parliament and the 
consequent carrying-over of the budget for the previous fiscal year, are 
unthinkable« Such a procedure would be contrary to the very idea of planning« 
2/ Constitutions of: Albania (articles 6, 59, 60); Bulgaria (articles 
12, 17> 39} 43)j Hungary (articles 5, 10, 25); Poland (articles 4> 7, 
8, 16, 28); CzechoSlovakia (articles 12, 162-164); USS& (articles 11, 
14, 60, 68, 70, 83); Yugoslavia (articles 15, 44, 81)® References 
taken from: Mirkine and Guetzévich, Les Constitutions Européennes * 
Paris, 1951; and Planning for Economic Development» Report of the 
Secretary-General transmitting the study of a Group of Experts, 
United Nations publication, 64»II«B»3, annex II, p.153° ' 
«2/ Ibid«, p.134« 
* * /No reference 
ST/ECLA/Conf»30/L.9 
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No reference is made to so unlikely an event in the Constitutions of the 
socialist countries, except in that of Poland article 8 of which provides 
that if the Diet does not pass the bills relating to the national economic 
plan and to the budget, the President of the Republic, acting through 
the Council of Ministers, shall make them law»^ 
Notwithstanding the importance of the resources generated by what 
are known as productive services (public industrial enterprises, etc») 
for the financing of public sector consumption and investment, tax revenue 
still plays a significant role- In this context, it is worth noting that 
tax autonomy is non-existent in the States members of the socialist 
5/ 
federations and, as a rule, among their local authorities tr* Obviously, 
the central government's control over the economy is greatly reinforced 
by this restriction of the power to tax of the decentralized territorial 
units. It implies the strengthening of the machinery for the adoption 
of decisions directly linked to planning, which is definitely classified 
as a constitutional matter» 
Hence it is clear that in the socialist countries those basic 
planning decisiones which are primarily political in character are the 
prerogative of the supreme political authorities: the national assembly 
and the government» 
2» The experience of developed countries with a 
free-enterprise system 
In countries where the free-enterprise system prevails, parliamentary 
approval of plans has been sporadic, and it is thought that a number of 
problems arise» It is contended, for example, that the flexibility of the 
plan is incompatible with the inflexibility of the law, and that approval 
of general principles, rather than of a specific text, would leave the 
Executive free to modify the objectives established»^ It would seem, however, 
y Mirkine and Guetzévich, op» cit» 
J5/ Constitutions ofî the USSR (article 14, (k)) and Yugoslavia 
(article 44» 2l)j op» cit» 
6/ Pierre Bauchet, La Planification française: IV. Le contrôle politique 
du plan; and John Hackett and Anne-Marie Hackett, Economic planning 





that the decision contained in article 2. of the law sanctioning France's 
Fourth Plan constitutes an important step forward in the search for the 
best solution. Under the terms of this, article, the Government will 
submit to Parliament, before sending its directives to the General 
Planning Comissariat, a bill approving a report on,the principal options 
governing the formulation of the Plan, in particular those concerning: 
economic growthj the distribution of the gross domestic product between 
investment and consumption; the structure of final consumption that is 
to be, desired; and the general lines of social and. regional policyo 
Stipulations such as these, which link the formulation of the plan 
to predetermined political directives, will clearly make it much easier 
for central and peripheral planners to co-ordinate macro-economic aggregates 
and annual sectoral programmes with a view to attaining the objectives 
established« The administrative importance of this legal provision could 
7/ 
hardly be overestimated«-1' However, whether in practice it does or does 
not succeed in producing all the effects envisaged will essentially depend 
upon the stability of the government, i,e«, upon the materialization of 
the French ideals "One Government, one Legislature, one Plan"e 
Even the oldest European - constitutions seldom allow for the 
possibility of the Legislature's withholding approval of the fiscal budget. 
There is an obvious explanation for this« In the past, the precise purpose 
and basis of the annual meeting of Parliament was, firstly, to authorize 
taxation and, secondly, to sanction public expenditure. There was only 
theoretical discussion of the possible legal and administrative implications 
of non-approval of the budget. Denmark and Finland, however, in their 
pre-1939 Constitutions, do establish regulations to be applied in this 
unlikely event, empowering the government to submit provisional appropriation 
bills to effect essential expenditure, etc. The reformed Constitutions 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and of France, which include provision 
for economic planning, solve the problem in different ways. The Government 
2J See Mary Parker Follet, "The Process of Control", Papers on the 
Science of Administration, ed* Lather Gulick and L, Urwick, New York, 
. Columbia University Press, 1937« 
/of the 
ST/ECLA/ Coaf .30/L»9 
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of the Federal Republic of Germany is authorized to maintain services 
previously established, to pay State commitments and to continue the 
execution of public works, drawing upon resources allocated in the previous 
fiscal year and on reserves of capital. The solution adopted by France 
(similar to Poland's) is more compatible with planning; if the government 
finance bill is not passed by Parliament within a period of seventy days, 
it can be brought into force by Executive Orders. 
A noteworthy feature is the brevity of the period allowed for 
parliamentary action on the finance bill in France. The government is 
thus enabled to present the draft fiscal budget at a date nearer to the 
beginning of the next fiscal year, and can more easily adjust it to actual 
conditions» 
Obviously, this necessary reduction of the time-limit should not 
imply a parallel weakening of Parliament's basic function: the determination 
of government policy. The technical machinery whereby this undesirable 
effect can be forestalled is defined in the theory and partly established 
in the legislation and practice of a number of countries. Reference must 
be made to the following procedures: making a distinction between the 
budget law and the operational budget - the former being of more over-all 
character and constructed on the basis of programmes, the latter presenting 
details of the combination of measures proposed by the government for the 
implementation of the programmes in question -j justifying the projects 
presented in both documents, in relation to medium-term plan objectives, 
special combinations of circumstances, etc., in the form of a Presidential 
message, having a study of the budget made by joint committees representative 
of the upper and lower Chambers; and, lastly, the passing of the bill 
by Parliament» 
It would be unreasonable to cut short the period assigned for budget 
procedures in Parliament, only to allow the administrative agencies an 
unnecessarily long time to prepare and co-ordinate their partial budgets. 
Given the reduction of the time-limit for parliamentary proceedings, the 
recommendations on socio-economic and financial policy transnitted annually 




as a guide to the formulation of their budgets could be issued later in 
the year« By that time data would be available not only on the results 
of the previous year, but also on the most indicative facts and prospective 
result's relating to the current year,-recommendations could then 
undoubtedly be couched in much more precise terms, thus facilitating the 
whole of the subsequent work of adjustment and co-ordination» 3h many 
countries, however, including seme of those with the most highly-developed 
economies, too much time is spent on the preparation of budget estimates 
by the administration« Where this is-the case, the equally desirable 
tightening-up of deadlines will depend, first, upon the establishment of 
a network of programming and budget agencies commensurate with the number 
and size of the sectoral units involved; and, secondly, upon how far the 
structure and functions of these agencies are so designed that, the higher 
the decision-making level, the saaller will be its responsibility for 
administrative matters and the greater its responsibility for policy-making« 
It is here that great difficulty will be encountered in breaking time-
honoured habits, which still lead some political assemblies to interfere 
even in administrative minutiae, just , as in the nineteenth century, when 
the budget law had to include an itemized classification of expenditure 
by purpose, in order to promote a control of budget execution which would 





PLANNING AND THE LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 
To study the administrative problems of planning frem the standpoint 
of its constitutional bases may seem a somewhat futile approach, in view 
of the inherent stability of the governing principles thus laid down» 
Nevertheless, it can be justified on several grounds» In the first place, 
the public administration acts within a framework of specific legal 
regulations, and, as has often been said, the titles of the chapters of 
administrative law are to be found in the Constitution» This increases 
the risk that the possibilities of adapting secondary regulations to 
planning needs may be restricted undesirably by constitutional provisions, 
either because they date from pre-planning times, or because an obvious 
intention to restrict planning, at any rate at the over-all level» 
Secondly, a number of constitutional provisions of importance for 
planning are more often conspicuous by their absence than by their adverse 
implications, especially where relations between the branches of government 
are concerned* In this case too it is worth-while to discuss the prospects 
for the solution of administrative problems apparently opened up by such 
omissions» The non-existence of an explicit regulation does not in itself 
preclude the existence of implicit restrictions in the text of the 
Constitution* 
1» Incorporation of planning in national Constitutions 
Even before the Punta del Est e Conference, some of the Latin American 
countries had incorporated the idea of planning in their Constitutions» 
For example, the Colombian Constitution of 1886, with its several revisions 
(the last reform having been introduced in 1957)> empowers Congress to 
determine the plans .and programmes which should govern the development 
of the national economy, and the plans and programmes for all public works 
to be undertaken or continued» Plan formulation and implementation are not 





responsibilities are confined to fulfilling the classic obligation to 
put before Congress, once a year, the income and expenditure budget for 
the coming fiscal year» 
Haiti and Honduras, whose most recent Constitutions were adopted 
in 1957 also, lay down more detailed planning regulations than Colombia, 
and even provide an institutional framework for the principal bodies 
responsible for plan formulation» The same course is pursued in the 
Constitution of Uruguay following its amendment in 1965« 
Brazil's 1967 Constitution authorizes the Federal Union to establish 
the national road communications plan, and to draw up and implement national 
education and health plans, regional development plans (article 8, X, XII, 
XIII and XIV)and land reform plans (article 46, III), although no specific 
reference is made to over-all medium- or long-term plans» However, the 
powers of the Federal authorities, especially the Executive are greatly 
strengthened in all fields relating to instruments for the control of 
short-tern economic policy» These points will be discussed elsewhere in 
the present document» 
The varying degrees of efficiency with which over-all development 
plans have been implemented in Latin America would seem to suggest that it 
makes little difference whether planning is incorporated in the Constitution 
or not» The inference apparently is that legal regulations cannot easily 
withstand the pressure of circumstances; but this is only partly true, for 
ill-success has often been due to the inconsistency or inadequacy of the 
basic provisions in this field» This question too will be discussed in 
the following sections» 
2» The presidential system and its possibilities as regards 
the requisite political support for plan formulation 
and implementation 
With the exception of the former British colonies, all the developing 
countries of the Americas have adopted the presidential system of government» 
This may make it easier for Latin America to put into practice the formula 
already quoted - one Government, one Legislature, one Plan on which the 
political support essential for plan formulation and implementation depends; 
and, conversely, it may make for the frustration of planning efforts, if 
/each government 
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each government aspires to bequeath a medium-term plan to its successor* 
The problem, therefore, is to establish machinery .which will maximize 
the favourable and minimize the unfavourable possibilities of the system» 
In the first place, it must be borne in mind that an over-all 
medium-term plan takes several years to formulate, and that, to judge 
from the experience of the countries which have drawn up and implemented 
the .largest number of plans,, it would be difficult, at the present level 
of information and technology, to prepare plans of the type considered 
idéal: i»e» "rolling" or continuous plans, whereby another final year is 
annually added to the over-all medium-term plan, as each year of the 
current plan is completed»^ (The validity of these statements is, of 
course, relative, depending on the essential nature and the complexity of . 
the economy involved.) On the other hand, it is true that once the over-all 
plan has been formulated, modifications can be introduced, in line with 
whatever economically feasible policy options are formulated» 
As a general rule, all or part of each new government's first year 
in office is covered by a fiscal budget adopted under the preceding 
government. The degree of flexibility of this instrument will determine, 
up to a point, how far the new government can begin to, take action in 
accordance with its own political directives, which in principle will also 
be those of the party or coalition that won the last election» Accordingly, 
part of each government's first, year in office should be devoted to the 
following tasks: a study of the over-all medium-term plan drafted by the 
central planning agency under the previous governmentj the establishment 
of guidelines for the planning agency's revision of this draft in conformity 
with the policy options agreed upon; and the submission of the revised plan 
by the Executive to the Legislature for its approval, which should precede 
or coincide with the adoption of the government budget for the next fiscal 
year* 
U Planning for Economic Development, op. cit.. pp»7-8j and Seminario 




For this mechanism to work well, consistency between the policies 
of the Executive and the parliamentary majority would have to be ensured, 
at least during the first year of each presidential term of office. 
Unfortunately, hardly any of the Latin American Constitutions seek to 
promote this« A first essential would be for the terms of office of the 
Executive and of the members of the Legislature to coincide at all levels 
(Federation, states, provinces and municipios)» This would pave the way 
for a full consultation of public opinion at regular intervals» with a 
view to complete policy overhaul. Although some regional differences of 
opinion might arise, on the whole the probable and desirable outcome would 
be that the victorious political forces would present a united front, 
particularly at the national level» 
Only the Constitutions of Brazil (articles 76 and 77) and Venezuela 
(articles 40 and 42) expressly lay down the foregoing principle» Under 
those of Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru, the terns of 
office of the President of the Republic and the members of the Legislature 
are of the same duration, but there is no stipulation that thqp must 
coincide» The other national Constitutions establish different periods of 
office for the Executive and the Legislature» 
Another principal of importance from the standpoint of the political 
strength of the Executive is that the President of the Republic must be 
elected by an absolute majority» Only the Constitutions of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil and Costa Rica contain such a provision«» 
Although consistency between the policies of the Executive and the 
parliamentary majority should perhaps be based on the coincidence of their 
terms of office and on the election of the President by an absolute majority, 
electoral legislation can undoubtedly do much to sustain it» This would 
be a case in which planning could be supported by secondary regulations, 





3• Planning and the possibility of carrying over 
the fiscal budget 
If the fiscal budget is thought of as an instrument for the short-term 
implement at ion not only of that part, of the medium-term plans which 
directly concerns the public sector, but also of a great many of the 
measures design«! to influence the behaviour of the private sector, the 
power to cany it over is of course essentially inimical to. planning» 
Express provision is made for the budget to be carried over, if 
the budget law is not passed in time, in the Constitutions of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay» The potential 
dangers of successive carry-overs are lessened in the Bolivian Constitution 
by the terms of article 114, which establishes that "should the budget not 
be adopted by the Legislature in two consecutive years, the most recent 
draft submitted by the Executive and not approved shall come into force 
for the next fiscal year"»* 
The Constitution of Uruguay affords three opportunities for the 
tacit rejection of the budget, inasmuch as it establishes (in .articles 217 
and 218) time-limits of forty-five days in the case of each Chamber and 
fifteen days in that of the General Assembly for the issue of a 
pronouncement on the draft or on amendments thereto, and adds that if no-
opinion is expressed by these institutions within the time-limits set, 
the draft shall be taken as rejected» As pointed out elsewhere in the 
present document, Uruguay has incorporated planning, together with programme 
and performance budgeting for the public sector, in its Constitution» 
The Constitutions of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and „ . 
Venezuela expressly state that the draft submitted by the Executive shall 
become law if it is not approved by the Legislature within the time-limits 
stipulated. Thus, thqy adopt the same solution as France and Poland» 
No reference to the hypothetical possibility of the budget1s not 
being approved at the appropriate time is made in the Constitutions of 






None of the countries in these last two groups has incorporated 
over-all planning in its Constitution» 
Wherever it is legally possible for the fiscal budget to be carried 
over-, the only way to safeguard planning will be to forestall the actual 
application of such a measure» The machinery for precluding this possibility 
may be classified as pre—eminently political or technical» 
Obviously j the importance of the distinction between the appropriation 
act and the operational budget, from the standpoint of facilitating the 
work of Parliament, increases proportionately to the volume and complexity 
of the government services« It will be negligible in small countries 
where the administrative structure is simple, and vital where the opposite 
is true; but in both cases, if the appropriation bill is drafted on the 
basis of programme and performance budgeting techniques, and the allocations 
are made at appropriate levels of aggregation, the voting process will not 
only be expedited, but will really come to signify policy-making, which is 
the specific function of the Legislature» It is here that the existence 
of a medium-term plan previously approved by the Legislature may facilitate 
decisions and help to ensure that the bill will be passed within the time-
limits established in the Constitution« Of course, an essential condition 
will be that the appropriation bill reflects the policy options agreed 
upon by the branches of government and incorporated in the plan, and that 
possible deviations, vfaether tactical or strategical, are duly justified 
in the message from the Executive» In fact, it would be desirable for 
such deviations to be jointly decided upon beforehand by the Executive and 
the Legislature» 
If the co-ordination between the branches of government is to be 
close enough to ensure concerted action right from the initial stages of 
policy formulation, the organization and procedures required will be of 
a kind that depend less on being spelt out than on acceptance of the 
necessity for them at the operational level» One of the most useful means 
to such an end is to see that the president of the central planning agency 
is a member of the government, where this is a corporate body with no 




adopted in the socialist countries, would be poor in most of the countries 
of Latin America, which have generally opted in favour of the presidential 
régime. Under governments of this type, statutory provision would have 
to be made for the leaders of the majority and of the opposition, or their 
representatives, to serve on the inter-Ministerial councils or commissions 
normally authorized to undertake the final co-ordination of medium-term 
plans and fiscal budgets. They should also participate in the adoption 
of annual operational plans and economic budgets»^ The central planning 
agency should also take care to keep the members of the Legislature 
individually informed of the significance and technical bases of the policy 
proposals formulated. This task, which would obviously be performed 
almost entirely through the transmittal of documents, would not be a mere 
public-relations function, but largely a matter of training political 
representatives to think in terms of economics and to understand national 
development problems. 
Another important means of facilitating the punctual adoption of plans 
and programmes is to ensure that some part is played in their formulation 
by the social groups most directly interested and capable of making useful 
contributions. This point has been fully discussed in the technical 
3/ literature on the subject»-4' 
4» Constitutional bases of taxation 
The well-known possibilities of taxation as an instrument of economic 
policy ̂  give unique importance to the possibility of centralizing the 
control of the tax system, and as far as possible avoiding decentralization 
of the power to levy taxes and determine their percentage rates» This is 
2/ For a discussion of the organization of planning systems, see Economic 
Survey of Latin America» 1964 op. cit., pp.328-381j Carlos Matus, 
"Planning systems and their enforcement in Latin America" (ST/ECLA/ 
Conf»20/L.13)J and United Nations Centre for Development Planning. 
Projections and Policies, "Some general conditions for the effective 
implementation of plans", op. cit» 
J3/ See Planning for Economic Development,op. cit., pp«4, 145-150. 
¡¡J In this connexion it is enlightening to refer to Hollis Chenery's 
classification of instruments of economic policy, reproduced in OAS, 
"El control de ejecución de planes generales de desarrollo en América 
Latina (Algunos aspectos vinculados con los presupuestos económicos 





traditionally considered a matter to be dealt with in the Constitution .. 
mainly because of its implications as regards the autonomy, of decentralized 
territorial units* 
As a general rule, the relevant provisions in the Constitutions of 
the Latin American countries would be no hindrance to the adoption of 
better solutions through ordinary law; but in some instances the position 
is less favourable» r Cases even exist in which regulations intended to 
protect the individual taxpayer against surprise measures actually cause 
a lack of flexibility that it would.be difficult to remedy» 
There is a possibility of achieving maximum centralization, allied 
to maximum flexibility in respect of decision-making in this field, if and 
when all the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) Taxes can be established, and their distribution among 
territorial units determined, only by the law of the country 
concerned; 
(b) The Constitution does not fix time-limits for the application 
of taxes instituted by decree or of changes in existing taxation; 
(c) The Executive is empowered to alter specific tax rates during 
the fiscal year, within the limits and in the circumstances 
stipulated by law» 
All these conditions in conjunction are not to be found in any Latin 
American country but, as is to be expected, the smaller the country, the 
higher the degree of centralization» For example, in the Central-American 
countries, the Constitution invariably leaves the distribution of revenue 
among the central government and such local authorities as exist to be 
settled by the law of the country; and where taxes are instituted locally," 
they are usually centrally-controlled, either by the Legislature (as in 
Costa Rica) or by the Executive (as in Guatemala and Nicaragua)» In 
El Salvador, the proposed tax schedules of the municipios have to be 
submitted for legal sanction at the national level» Elsewhere, the provisions 






(a) The situation in the unitary States of South America 
A wide variety of procedures is to be found in the unitary States» In 
Bolivia» national law determines which taxes are to be applied at the 
level of the country as a whole, of departments and of municipios3 and 
the municipios can neither establish nor abolish taxes without the prior 
approval of the Senate» Thus the degree of centralization is decidedly high* 
In Colombia, national renevue and the power to tax accorded to the 
departments and municipios are established by Congress» The Constitution 
sets time-limits of six months for the application of new or increased 
indirect taxes, and of three months for the initiation of the process of 
reducing import duties, which is spread over ten months» Any increase in 
import duties will be applied in three instalments, in the three months 
following the passing of the Act» Taxes and assessments cannot legally 
be collected unless they are incorporated in the budget; and, lastly, it is 
a precept of the Constitution that the annual budget must balanceo 
Unquestionably, these provisions would hamper the use of taxation and 
the budget as instruments for obtaining short-tern financing, and, in part, 
for promoting the reallocation of funds for economic development purposes* 
In Chile» the power to levy taxes comes under ordinary law» The 
relevant constitutional provisions create no particular difficulty» 
It would seem that under the Constitution of Ecuador no power to 
legislate on taxation and assessments is delegated to local or provincial 
units» This power is apparently centralized in Congress, and there is no 
requirement which runs counter to the objectives under discussion* 
In the Constitution of Paraguay, the only clause relating to taxes 
is article 76 (3), which empowers the Chamber of Deputies to legislate on 
taxes and assessments in general* 
The Constitution of Peru specifically allocates the power to levy many 
taxes to the departments, and authorizes the State to add others to the 
list* The taxes concerned are not among the most important as instruments 
of economic policy, except for the progressive income tax, which is one of 
the sources of revenue of the departments* On the other hand, this allocation 
of resources does not apparently imply that the departments are endowed with 





Given these features of the Peruvian Constitution, and the fact 
that it does not establish time-limits for the application of new taxes 
or tax changes, it would apparently be no bar to the use of taxation for 
the purposes of economic policy« 
(b) The situation in the federal States 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela have adopted differing 
procedures as regards the distribution of resources among the three levels 
of government and the determination of each one's power to tax« 
Under the Constitution of Argentina, import and export duties and 
all other assessments levied by the National Congress are allocated to the 
Federal Government« Import and export duties are the only indirect taxes 
over which the Federation has entire control; direct taxes are considered 
exceptional, and also fall within the competence of the Federal Government 
(article 67)« In other tax fields, similar powers are granted to the 
provinces, which exercise all those not expressly assigned to the Federation 
(article 104)« 
It might be thought that so large a measure of tax autonomy would make 
co-ordination between the Federation and the provinces difficult, especially 
if it is to be as close as over-all planning would probably require; but 
the length of time that these principles have prevailed (the Argentine 
Constitution dates back to i860 and was amended in 1866, 1898 and 1957) 
suggests that in practice a high degree of co-ordination has been achieved, 
through ordinary law, agreements and less formal procedures9 
In Brazil, by long-standing tradition, the distribution of tax revenue 
and of the corresponding powers to legislate among the Federal Union, the 
states and the municipios is strictly governed by the Constitution» The 
provisions of the latest Constitution (1967) have been tightened up still 
further, obviously with the aim of establishing the conditions for the 
centralized control of econoraic policy. Thus, it assigns to the Federal 
Union import and export duties and taxes on all the following items: rural 
real estate; income; credit, exchange and insurance operations and those 
relating to securities (including bearer bonds); transport and communications 
services (except where they pertain strictly to the municipios); electric 





of greatest importance for the short-term, control of the economy and for 
the reallocation of resources for development are assigned to the Federal 
Union. The sole exception would seem to be the purchase tax, which, 
despite its influence on price formation, still falls within the competence 
of the states (which absorb 80 per cent) and the municipios. However, 
the rate is uniform, i.e., it is unaffected by the nature of the goods 
taxed, and cannot exceed the limits set by the Senate; moreover, the tax 
is not of the cascade type, but is levied on the value added by each 
separate operation in the marketing process» These characteristics are 
intended to limit the use of the purchase tax as a weapon of economic 
policy; in other words, any attempt to ensure the progressiveness of 
indirect taxation seems to be made through the tax on manufactures (which 
is likewise levied on the value added) and through import dutiesj which 
are heaviest in the case of products consumed by the higher income groups® 
Where import duties are concerned, this principle is not very strictly 
observed, since the aim of the tax is primarily to protect domestic 
production, and only secondarily to provide revalue. 
The intention to construct the tax system in such a way as to 
facilitate its use as an instrument of economic policy can be inferred not 
only from the foregoing decisions, but also from others whereby: (a) the 
product of export duties and taxes on credit, exchange and insurance operations 
or c»i those relating to securities (including bearer bonds) can be allocated 
under ordinary law to the formation of monetary reserves (article 23, 3); 
(b) the Executive is empowered to alter, in the circumstances and within 
the limits established by law, the rates or bases for calculation of the 
taxes referred to and of export duties, in order to bring them into line 
with the objectives of the monetary policy» 
The disparities in regional income levels in Brazil, and all their 
implications, are well-known. With the aim of reducing them to a minimum 
over the long term, the national legislation has for some years past 
included tax policy measures which have been very successful and which make 
for a redistribution of investment, especially investment in industry, to 
the benefit of the relatively less developed areas. Moreover, as a general 
rule the states have established their own tax instruments, with a view to 





The latest Constitution endorses the foregoing policy, and contains 
several provisions that should help to reduce the inter-regional disparities 
by guaranteeing the states and municipios a supply of funds that is not 
dependent on regional income, and by promoting co-ordination between the 
Federal, state and local authorities« Thus the states and municipios are 
assured of a share in the most productive Federal taxes, and that share 
may be- increased if they sign agreements with the Union to ensure 
co-ordination of the respective investment and tax administration programmes« 
In addition, they have to use 50 per cent of their quota for financing 
capital outlays« 
Under the Constitution of México, it is the Federation that is 
authorized to levy taxes on foreign trade, mineral products (including coal 
and petroleum) and other natural resources, the operations of credit and 
insurance institutions, electric power, tobacco, matches, certain alcoholic 
beverages and forest industries« 
The states receive a proportion of the yield of these taxes which is 
fixed by ordinary Federal lawj and the state Legislatures determine the 
share of the municipios» Apparently the Constitution, which makes no 
mention of income tax, empowers the states to establish other taxes, but 
forbids them to institute customs duties or taxes affecting passengers or 
goods in transit. 
The use of taxes as instruments of economic policy is expressly 
provided for in article 131, paragrpah 2, besides being implicit as an 
objective in the distribution of revenue among the different levels of 
government and in the conferring of powers on the Executive to change the 
percentage rates of export and import duties. 
The Constitution of Venezuela (article 21, 4) lists the taxes that 
can be levied by the municipios, which are those generally considered to 
be local in character« Neither the states nor the Federation can exercise 
any control over the municipios in respect of taxation. Thus conceived, 
the autonomy of the municipios might in some circumstances become a stumbling-
block to co-ordination between the local, state and Federal authorities 
where industrial development, housing programmes or net wealth taxes are 
concerned, given the extent of the municipios' powers in respect of business 





The states cannot establish import, export or transit duties on 
domestic or foreign goods, or on other items taxable by the national 
Government or the municipios; nor can they tax consumer goods prior to their 
entry into circulation in the state territory, or ban the consumption. 
of goods produced outside the state, or tax the latter differently from 
goods produced within the area of their jurisdiction. 
The attributions of the national Government include the power to 
establish, collect, inspect and control rates and taxes and other revenue 
not assigned to the states or municipios« 
Taken in conjunction, the provisions relating to.the spheres of tax 
competence of the Federation and the states lead to the conclusion that 
it is for ordinary law to define how the sources of revenue are to be 
distributed between the two levels of government, since the Constitution 
does not seem to countenance duality of competence in any area of taxation© 
In principle, the breadth of scope left by the Constitution to 
secondary legislation should facilitate co-ordination. 
Article 124 lays it down that no tax or assessment can be increased 
or reduced until after the expiry of a term to be fixed in every case, 
except when special powers have been granted to the Executive» Should the 
term in question not be defined in the Constitution, its establishment by 
ordinary law would not appreciably undermine the efficacy of possible 
economic policy measures. How far this is true will obviously depend upon 
court decisions as to the length of the periods concerned, 
(c) Administrative questions 
From the strictly administrative standpoint, the use of taxes as 
instruments of economic policy within the framework of planning would call 
for a close linkage between the tax administration agencies and the central 
and - where they exist - the sectoral planning units. These questions 
were discussed at a seminar on operational plans held by the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) at Santiago, Chile, in 
The following extremes of opinion were expressed; (a) that the 





planning agencies should draft taxation bills and any others required to 
provide the instruments for plan implementation; (b) that this responsibility 
should be carried by the appropriate agencies of the public administration» 
Perhaps the best solution would be for the planning agency (central or 
sectoral) to specify the changes (short-term or structural) that should be 
introduced into the tax system, and to prepare the requisite draft legislation 
in collaboration with the fiscal departments« This would have the merit 
of associating the units that would subsequently be the executing agencies 
with the formulation of the measures, and would obviate the need for the 
planning agencies to overload their manning-tables with technical experts 
in all the innumerable fields of public-service activity, as would otherwise 
be inevitable, since the provision of instruments for plan implementation 
does not entail tax measures alone» 
Furthermore, in view of the special importance of taxation in 
relation to economic planning, it should be established by law that no 
bill to create or modify taxes should be submitted by the Executive or, if 
proposed by members of the Legislature, discussed in either Chamber, 






Although over-all administrative reform cannot be envisaged as a 
short- or medium-term objective, as demonstrated in the first section of 
the present document, it should undoutedly constitute one of the essential 
targets of the long-term plan, to be attained by succesive annual stageso 
It has already been pointed out that "administration for development" has 
a restricted meaning, and represents a requisite for plan implementation; 
in contrast, "the development of administration" is a permanent objective, , 
whose importance, vital in the early years, may not grow less with the 
passage of time> notwithstanding the law of diminishing returns; for the 
present phase in the history of the public sector is one of marked 
expansion« 
No Latin American country has carried out an over-all study in depth 
of the productivity of the public sector, but partial analyses, almost 
always made with a view to the rationalization of procedures and structures, 
have invariably brought to light an immense waste of human and material 
resources. To take the findings of«this research as generally applicable 
would probably be to exaggerate the inefficiency of the region's civil 
services as a whole, for the mere fact that this research was undertaken 
is in itself an indication that existing conditions were seen to be abnormal« 
However, the a priori statement that low productivity is a characteristic 
feature of the civil service in Latin America is probably true enough, if 
allowance is made for possible exceptions that confirm the rule. This state 
of affairs stems from deep-lying historical, sociological and economic roots* 
1/ See Helio Jaguaribe, 0 Estado Cartorial (The Notary State)» Higher 
Institute of Brazilian Studies (Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros) 
Rio de Janeiro, I960; and Investment and Economic Development Commission 
(Comisión de Inversiones y Desarrollo Económico - CIDE), "Estudio 
Económico del Uruguay", Montevideo, 1964, mimeographed edition. In 
the latter study the Uruguayan civil service is said to have become 




Any increase in the productivity of the public sector in Latin 
America would probably be linked primarily to the labour factor, and would 
have a multiplier effect upon the development of the region» There are 
a number of grounds for this assertion» The first point to take into 
account is the great and growing relative importance of the governments 
share in the gross national product, which ranges from 42 per cent (in 
Bolivia) to a proportion which is probably never less than 14 per cent 
(Costa Rica), public enterprises being included in every case» The average 
figure is about 25 per cent» Again, an economic breakdown of expenditure 
shows that approximately 75 per cent corresponds to consumer outlays 
(mainly on salaries and wages and other forms of personnel remuneration), 
2/ 
leaving 25 per cent for real and financial investment and capital transfers»-' 
Almost the whole of the government's capital expenditure is effected 
through the private sector, on the basis of contracts for the execution 
of public works, purchases of equipment, etc» In other words, an improvement 
in the productivity of the public sector should signify a corresponding 
reduction in its unproductive consumer expenditure, which in turn would 
permit of an equivalent increase in State investment or a parallel 
expansion of current expenditure on services of real value to the public, 
with no aggravation of the tax: burden. 
Unfortunately, these effects are seldom seen in practice. 
Rationalization generally results in the release of manpower, which, owing 
to administrative inertia, is kept on in offices whose methods have been 
simplified, automation has been introduced, and unproductive activities 
have been reduced or eliminated. The only consequence is that the disguised 
under-employment situation becomes worse than ever» let with a little 
relatively modest investment, genuine conditions of full employment could 
be established in the public sector. Indeed, administrative inefficiency 
masks one highly favourable feature: the potential availability of 
substantial human resources, whose wages are paid by the government, and, 
on a smaller scale, of materials, facilities and buildings owned by the 




public sector» All this potential could be mobilized to expand the 
3/ 
country's productive capacity »^ 
Opportunities for applying this potential in these and other ways 
should be sought by the planners, or perhaps more specifically by technical 
experts in budget administration and administrative rationalization» This 
is a crucial aspect of the work of providing instruments for plan 
implementation. Latin American development plans place emphasis on 
particular measures considered to be of basic importance, such as land, 
tax and administrative reforms, which have little or no immediate political 
viability, and they omit more practical recommendations relating to specific 
projects and to the practical steps that must be taken to mobilize resources 
for their execution. Planners seem to have adopted a somewhat idealistic 
approach - the advocacy of structural changes to make development possible — 
when perhaps the converse would have been a more realistic and fruitful 
formula, i.e., the promotion of certain types of development to make 
structural changes possible. 
One pointer to the abstract nature of the Latin American plans is that 
none of them contains proposals for the creation of development funds out 
of tax revenue. Yet a lesson might have been learnt from France, whose 
Economic and Social Development Fund has been one of the main instruments 
for the execution of the projects envisaged in the plans, and also for 
operations designed to increase productivity«^ Again, thought might have 
been given to the example set within the region by Brazil, which for many 
years has been using fiscal savings to finance projects for building 
J/ The existing disguised unemployment also implies, at least in some 
measure, a disguised savings potential« See Ragnar Nurkse, 
Problemas de formación de capital, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1955» p.50» 




infrastructural facilities or for launching privâtely-owried or semi-public 
industrial enterprises;^ or the recommendations of economic theory might 
have been followed»^' 
The establishment and operation of efficient instruments for the 
promotion of development has perhaps been, a good deal more fruitful than 
planning in itself* Although no research has-been undertaken which would 
either substantiate or invalidate this postulate, it is borne out by such' 
cases as that of Mexico - with its Nacional Pinanciera - Colombia - which 
has similar institutions - and Brazil as mentioned above® These countries 
achieved very satisfactory rates of industrial expansion, despite their 
relatively low per capita income levels, throughout the long period 
extending from 1950 to 1964»"^ Mexico has not adopted over-all planning. 
From the foregoing, it would seem that the administrative organization of 
planning involves a special problem» It is essential that the planning 
units should be provided with personnel qualified to define the nature and 
scope of the instruments for plan implementation and, in co-operation with 
the appropriate agencies of the public administration, or with the private 
sector, to draft the pertinent measures and.see that they are really put 
into effect. 
One such instrument might be the establishment of public or semi-
public financial, industrial, agricultural or transport enterprises to be 
responsible for launching and subsequently managing projects relating to 
Jj/ Tax resources earmarked for.the promotion of development are applied 
mainly through Federal banks (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Economico, Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, Banco da Amazonia)» The states 
have adopted similar procedures, and have even been able to safeguard 
the continuity operation of some of their planning agencies "in 
principle, by an instrument linking them to tax revenue..thé proceeds 
of which were permanently allocated to them on their establishment" 
(see "Economic planning in Brazil at the level of the states", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America» vol.XI, N° 2,., 1966, .United Nations 
publication, Sales N°Î 67.II.G.4, p.72)» 
6/ For example, the comments and argimients formulated by E.Nurksê, 
op.cit., pp. 170 ff» 
2/ See Roque Carranza, op» cit., tables 1 and 160, and Economic Survey 




important plan objectives, especially when the amount of capital required 
is likely to exceed the sums that could be contributed by voluntary saving. 
Such enterprises would generate their own resources, and, by absorbing 
some of the disguised unemployment in the public sector, would help to 
reduce fiscal-budget deficits and to ensure that resources formerly tied 
up in parasitical or obstructive activities became productive*^" 
In proposing measures of this kind, planners should follow the lines 
of least political resistance. It is highly unlikely that any significant 
social group would raise objections, for example, to the execution of 
industrial projects. As they were put into effect, however, there would 
be ¿Lashes with the old bureaucratic, agrarian, tax and other structures, 
which would make for their reform» even at the cost of a certain amount of 
friction. That would be inevitable and useful, for as Mary Parker Follet 
points out, "Like engineers we must set friction to work for us" ̂  Planners 
must deliberately seek such clashes, but only at judiciously chosen intervals 
so as not to create undue social tensions. The clashes would be planned, 
and also inevitable, for if a country was in a position to apply the 
principle of balanced growth, it would not be an under-developed country*^/ 
Since the present document is concerned with the administrative 
aspects of planning, it would be out of place here to embark upon the long 
and thorough discussion that such questions require. They are mentioned 
only because of their importance in relation to the viability of administrative 
reform* 
8/ Some public enterprises in Latin America are run at a loss, especially 
railway and shipping companies. This does not invalidate the 
argument* 
_2/ Quoted in United Nations Development Programme, Briefing of International 
Consultants, New York, United Nations, January 196?» p.16. 
10/ Albert Hirschman, quoted by Albert "«¡aterston in "What is the function 
of the Public Administration" (provisional translation, English text 
unavailable), in Finance and Development, International Monetary 
Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Vol. IV, No. 3» September 1967* 
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